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INTRODUCTION

There are approximately three thousand plaintiffs currently engaged in
litigation regarding asbestos related diseases in the Eastern District of
Texas alone.1 The majority will not be able to recover damages for inju-

1. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
The number is due mainly to the number of petrochemical plants and shipyards in this
region. Id. at 1354.
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ries caused by the failure of asbestos manufacturers to adequately warn
of the dangerousness of their product because they are unable to identify
which specific manufacturer's asbestos particle invaded their lungs.' Although an individual injured by a product may seek recovery from the
manufacturer under various theories,3 a theory often relied on by plaintiffs in asbestos litigation is strict products liability.4 The purpose of this
comment is to familiarize the reader with asbestos litigation in Texas and
the use of "market share" liability.5 While the author does not purport to
have treated all aspects of the asbestos problem, an attempt has been
made to address the more troublesome issues and propose a remedy to
facilitate the disposal of asbestos plaintiffs' claims.
II.

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN TEXAS

The Texas Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for prod-

2. See id. at 1354. Generally, the plaintiff must identify the defendant as the manufacturer or seller of the product that injured him. Failure to do so has proven fatal to the
plaintiff's suit. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); 1 R.
HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974). The inability to identify a particular manufacturer or seller has arisen with other products. See, e.g.,
Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (plaintiff unable to identify
manufacturer of DES); Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 358
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (in many instances manufacturer of cap unknown); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (plaintiff cannot identify manufacturer),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
3. See I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1:3-:5 (2d ed.
1974). In many jurisdictions, an injured plaintiff may sue in negligence, for breach of warranty, or strict products liability. Id. § 1:5.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
5. Market share liability has been proposed for use in those cases in which the plaintiff
is unable to identify the manufacturer. Once the plaintiff proves exposure to the product
and damages, the burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980). But see id. at 938-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (arguing against soundness of majority's market share remedy).
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ucts liability based on implied warranty over forty years ago. The court
held that neither privity of contract nor proof of negligence were necessary for the plaintiff to recover.7 Twenty-five years later, in McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc.,6 the court adopted section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. s For section 402A to apply, the defendant must be a
seller of goods. 10 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove, regardless of negligence, that the defendant's product was unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. 11 Thus, the focus of a strict liability action is not the
acts or omissions of the manufacturer, but the product itself."8 Furthermore, the plaintiff must be a user or consumer' s and must prove a defect
in either manufacturing, marketing or design. "
Marketing products which are viewed as unavoidably unsafe because
there is both utility and risk in their use may give rise to liability when
the manufacturer fails to adequately warn the consumer or user of the

6. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 610, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942).
The Texas Supreme Court held the defendant meat packer liable, regardless of negligence,
for the plaintiff's injuries resulting from ingestion of contaminated sausage. Id. at 612, 164
S.W.2d at 829. The basis of liability was "an implied warranty imposed by operation of law
as a matter of public policy." Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
7. See id. at 617, 620, 164 S.W.2d at 832, 834. Privity applies only when the suit is
based upon breach of contract. Liability for the sale of contaminated food is imposed by
operation of law. Id. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831-32.
8. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
9. See id. at 789. The court was of the opinion that the rule in Decker, essentially
section 402A of the Restatement, logically applied to defective products. Id. at 789.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965). Section 402A "applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products." Id. A "seller" includes
distributors, retailers, and manufacturers. See, e.g., McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967) (section 402A embraces distributors); Griggs Canning Co. v.
Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 634, 164 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942) (retailers classified as sellers); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942) (manufacturers
classified as sellers). Goods are "any product[s] sold in the condition, or substantially the
same condition, in which [they are] expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A comment d (1965).

11. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967) (section
402A imposed regardless of negligence). The Restatement defines unreasonably dangerous
as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
12. See Gonzales v. Catapillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978).
13. The consumer need not have purchased the item. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment 1 (1965). He may be a family member, guest, employee, or donee.
Id. A "user" is one who passively enjoys the product. Id.
14. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). The three
defects recognized by section 402A are those of manufacturing, marketing, and design. See
generally Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 25-32 (1979).
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dangerous nature of the product.16 The duty of the manufacturer to warn
arises when there exists reasonably foreseeable risks in the use of the
product."0 One of the basic requirements a plaintiff must fulfill in a strict
liability action is the identification of the manufacturer as the seller of
the product that caused his injury.' 7 The inability to meet this requirement has prompted many plaintiffs to develop novel theories of apportioning liability.
III.
A.

EXISTING THEORIES OF RECOVERY

The Alternative Liability Theory

Generally, in a products liability action, the plaintiff is able to identify
a specific product manufactured by the defendant. 18 There have been
cases, however, in which the plaintiff has not been able to identify a par15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). When accompanied by proper directions and warning, an unavoidably unsafe product is not unreasonably
dangerous and the manufacturer is not liable for any "unfortunate consequences." Id. Usually such products are drugs, chemicals or machinery. See, e.g., Martinez v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976) (lack of adequate warning rendered Hytrol-D defective or unreasonably dangerous); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.
1974) (failure to provide warning presented defect in polio vaccine), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(failure to give adequate warnings rendered asbestos unreasonably dangerous), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); see also Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33
(Tex. 1974) (drug cannot be made perfectly safe, but reasonably safe if accompanied by
warning); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (manufacturer of product with high risk of human
harm legally obligated to provide warning); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15,
17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insecticide involved danger to user
therefore manufacturer must warn).
16. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir. 1980). One commentator has suggested the duty to warn arises with "foreseeably unreasonable risks." See Edgar,
Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 31 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (fundamental principle that plaintiff must prove defendant manufactured injury causing product); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733 (Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiff has burden of
proving defendant's product caused injury); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d
519, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proof of causation necessary element of strict liability case).
18. See, e.g., Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429, 429 (Tex. 1974)
(plaintiff able to identify manufacturer of talwin); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff joined specific manufacturer as defendant); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d
15, 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff joined manufacturer of
defective product).
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ticular defendant." Illustrative isSummers v. Tice,2 in which the California Supreme Court was confronted with an injured plaintiff who,

through no fault of his own, could not identify the defendant responsible

for his injury.2 Rather than dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action, the
court held that each joined defendant should bear the burden of proving
his act did not cause the plaintiff's injury."" This theory of recovery has
been referred to as "alternative liability,"" and is embodied in section
4
433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
B.

The Concert of Action Theory

The "concert of action" theory, set forth in section 876 of the Restatement is also available to plaintiffs when two or more manufacturers are

joined in a products liability action .' Under this concept, one is liable if
he does a tortious act in concert with another, or knowingly renders assistance or encouragement to one whose conduct constitutes a breach of

19. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (plaintiff
unable to identify manufacturer of DES); Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiffs unable to identify manufacturer of blasting caps);
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (plaintiff unable
to identify manufacturer of DES ingested by her mother), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
20. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
21. See id. at 1-2.
22. See id. at 5.
23. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). Section 433B(3) provides:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not
caused the harm.
Id. The reason for subsection three is the injustice of allowing defendants to escape liability
due to the plaintiff's inability to prove which defendant caused the harm. See id. comment
f. Plaintiff must still prove that his injury resulted from the tortious acts of two or more
defendants. See id. comment g.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Section 876 provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
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duty to a third person.2 6 Additionally, one may be liable if the assistance
or encouragement, viewed independently, constitutes a breach of duty."7
There is no requirement of an express agreement; a mere tacit understanding is sufficient." Even if the defendant could prove the product
was not manufactured by him, plaintiff's showing of a tacit understanding
would bring the defendant within the purview of section 876.29 Identification is not an issue. The theory is not applied in cases in which the plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer.8 0 To do so might expose a single
manufacturing defendant to liability for the defects permeating an entire
industry."'
C.

The Enterprise Liability Theory

A third theory, referred to as both enterprise liability and industrywide liability," was formulated in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co. 33 In Hall, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries suffered
by children who had detonated blasting caps. 8 ' The plaintiffs joined virtually the entire industry and the trade association, alleging there was a
duty to warn of the dangerousness of blasting caps which had been
breached by the entire industry. 8 The plaintiffs also claimed industrywide cooperation among the defendants with regard to the design, manu-

26. See id. comment a. Parties are in concert when they act in accordance with an
agreement. Id. comment a. The giving of advice or encouragement to one who plans a tortious act renders the giver of such advice or encouragement liable to the injured party. Id.
comment d. Furthermore, if one gives assistance to or personally participates in, a united
effect, that is a breach of duty to a third person, he is liable. See id. comment e.
27. See id. comment e.
28. See id. comment a. The agreement need not be in words, it may be implied from
the conduct. Id. comment a.
29. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140-41,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
30. See id. at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The plaintiff's allegations based on concert of
action do not rest on the problem of identification, but a tacit agreement among the defendants. Id. at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
31. See id. at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
32. See id. at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. "Enterprise liability" was the plaintiff's terminology for industry-wide liability. Id. at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
33. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. See id. at 358. The decision is a consolidation of two similar suits. See id. at 358
(inability to identify manufacturer was issue in Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.).
35. See id. at 358. There was a possibility, however, that some of the caps were of
Canadian manufacture. Id. at 379. The plaintiffs did not allege a failure to warn, but a
failure to warn adequately. Id. at 359. They conceded that the industry, through the trade
association, warned users and the general public of the dangers of blasting caps, but claimed
that the industry had considered and wrongfully rejected the use of a warning label on
blasting caps. Id. at 359.
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facture, and marketing of blasting caps. 6 As in Summers, the plaintiffs
were unable to identify a specific defendant.3 7 The plaintiffs in Hall,
therefore, joined the entire blasting cap industry.38 The court determined
that under the circumstances, the defendants should have the burden of
proving causation, provided the plaintiffs show the caps had been manufactured by any one of the defendants. 3 9 The court reasoned that if statistics on blasting cap injuries were compiled by the trade association, the
defendants would be better able to allocate risk control measures." The
court, however, concluded with a caveat, stating that the application of
industry-wide liability should be limited to those industries made up of
only a few manufacturers.' 1
IV.

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories:THE MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
THEORY AND

DES

LITIGATION

In Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories,'4 the plaintiffs, in a class action suit,
sought to recover from the defendant drug manufacturers for injuries
they allegedly received due to their mothers' ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES), a purported anti-abortificant."I The plaintiffs were able to
prove that the defendants manufactured DES between 1941 and 1971 and
that it was prescribed to their mothers, when pregnant, to prevent miscarriage." They further established that all the defendants manufactured
the drug from the same basic formula, shared test data, and marketed
and promoted DES as a safe, effective drug.' 5 The plaintiffs sought recovery under theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and
implied warranties.' 6

36. See id. at 359.
37. See id. at 379.
38. See id. at 358.
39. See id. at 379.
40. See id. at 378.
41. See id. at 378. The court stated that what would be fair and feasible for an industry
of few producers might be unfair if applied to an industry of many producers. Id. at 378.
42. 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
43. See id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. DES is a synthetic form of estrogen. See
PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1055 (35th ed. 1981).
44. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The Food and Drug Administration authorized DES for use in
preventing miscarriage in 1947. See generally P. RHEINGOLD, DRUG LITIGATION 107 (3d ed.
1981).
45. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133-34,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
46. See id. at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. The plaintiffs alleged a separate cause of
action for negligence in failure to test the drug. Id. at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged causes of action based on false and fraudulent representations,
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The California Supreme Court considered and rejected the three bases
for trying the action urged by the plaintiffs. 47 The plaintiffs encountered
a fundamental problem in that they could not prove a particular manufacturer's product was responsible for any one plaintiff's injury."' Several
factors contributed to the problem of identification. For example, the latency period for the onset of symptoms revealing either adenosis 49 or adenocarcinoma 5° is, at a minimum, ten to twelve years from the date of exposure." Moreover, most doctors prescribed DES generically, and
pharmacists generally filled these prescriptions with whatever brand they
had in stock at the time.2 The plaintiff's theory of recovery based on
alternative liability was rejected by the court because, unlike the circumstances in Summers, the defendants were in no better position to identify
the tortfeasor than were the plaintiffs.8" In Summers, the only two possi-

misbranding, conspiracy, and "lack of consent." Id. at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
47. See id. at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The plaintiff's complaint suggested three theories under which the action could be tried-alternative liability, concert of action, and industry-wide liability. Id. at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The concert of action theory was
rejected because the plaintiff's allegations did not state a cause of action. Id. at 932, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 140. The plaintiff's alleged a failure to test adequately, and other acts or omissions.
Id. at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The theory of industry-wide liability met with disfavor
because the court in Hall expressly stated that it should be used only when the industry
involved was relatively small. Id. at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143; see also Hall v. E. I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (possibility of manifest unreasonableness if applied to decentralized industries).
48. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
49. See id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr at 133. Adenosis is a benign, pre-cancerous vaginal or
cervical growth. Id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The condition must be checked twice a
year by biopsy or calposcopy. Id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133; see also Celebre, Management of Vaginal Adenosis at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 16 J. OF REPRODUCTIVE MED. 293, 293 (1976) (article presents techniques employed in diagnosis and
follow up); Herbst, Problems in the Examination of the DES-Exposed Female, 46 OBST.
AND GYNEC. 353, 353-55 (1975) (discusses various presentations and problems of diagnosis).
50. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Adenocarcinoma is a "fast-spreading and deadly disease, and
radical surgery is required to prevent it from spreading." Id. at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133;
see also Herbst, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 878, 878-81
(1974) (discusses diagnosis and treatment of vaginal adenocarcinoma). See generally Roth &
Hornback, Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix in Young Women, 232 J.A.M.A. 768
(1975) (discusses diagnosis and treatment of cervical adenocarcinoma).
51. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
52. See id. at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
53. Compare Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
138-39, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (two hundred possible tortfeasors not all joined)
with Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1,2 (Cal. 1948) (both possible tortfeasors joined). The only
viable defense would be non-manufacture of the drug during the period in question. See
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ble tortfeasors were joined as defendants. 4 In Sindell, there were over
two hundred manufacturers of DES and only ten were joined. 5 Thus, the
court believed the possibility the guilty tortfeasor would escape liability
was too great to allow recovery under that theory." Faced with the spectre of innumerable remediless plaintiffs57 the California Supreme Court
formulated a new theory of recovery.5 8 Although neither party could identify the manufacturer, the court concluded the loss was better borne by
the defendants." In order to prevail under this theory, the plaintiff must
join a substantial share of the product's manufacturers.6 0 If this can be
done, shifting the burden of proving causation is reasonable because there
is greater chance the actual tortfeasor has been joined. 61 The defendants
who could not exculpate themselves would then be liable for a percentage
of the judgment commensurate with their percentage of the market."

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980). Though a manufacturer may not be in a better position to identify the
tortfeasor, he may be able to exonerate himself. Id. at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
54. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138-39,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
55. See id. at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Of those ten, only five appealed. Id. at 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 134.
56. See id. at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The possibility that any of the five of a possible two hundred defendants supplied the drug was so remote, the court stated that to shift
the burden to the defendants under the Summers rule would be unfair. Id. at 931, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 139. The policy reasons that support the Summers rule are lacking in Sindell. The
Summers court determined that as between plaintiff and defendants, the latter were in a
better position to know who the tortfeasor was. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.
1948). In Sindell, however, the manufacturers were in no better position than the plaintiffs
on the issue of identification. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 138, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
57. See id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. If the court was confined to Summers and
Hall, or if it required the plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer, the plaintiffs would be
barred from recovery. Id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
58. See id. at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The basis of the market-share theory is
public policy. Id. at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The court looked to Justice Traynor's
dissent in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (Cal. 1944) for guidance.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965) (suggests possibility of modifying alternative liability rule to provide for unforeseen
possibilities).
59. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The court restated the Summers rule that "as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury." Id. at
936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
60. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
61. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
62. Id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Thus, each defendant's liability will correspond to
its percentage of the market. Id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The defendants may also
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The court did, however, recognize the shortcomings of this new theory.
The passage of time renders the accurate determination of market share
nearly impossible due to the destruction of records and failed memories."
Thus, slight discrepancies between market share and actual liability are
inevitable, leaving much of a jury's determination of the percentage of
liability to speculation."'
A.

Strict Liability Under Borel v. FibreboardPaper Products

Clarence Borel had been an insulation worker at various locations in
Texas and was exposed to heavy concentrations of asbestos dust over his
thirty-three year career.6s Of the eleven original defendants joined in the
suit, four settled before trial,66 and a fifth received an instructed verdict
because the plaintiff was unable to prove exposure to his product. 7 The
trial proceeded against the remaining six defendants, 6s resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff of over $70,000.0 The complaint alleged negligence,
gross negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in the "failure to
take reasonable precautions or to exercise reasonable care to warn

. . .

of

the danger."70 The defendants obtained a jury finding that Borel was contributorily negligent.7 ' Nevertheless, the jury found all the defendants lia-

cross-claim and implead manufacturers who may have supplied the product in question, but
were not joined as defendants. Id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr., at 145.
63. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. An example of the problems a plaintiff may
face in identifying a particular defendant is found in Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp.
337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
64. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). There is no basis in the opinion for the assertion that any
discrepencies would be minor. Id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145; see also Summers v. Tice,
199 P.2d 1,5 (Cal. 1948) (jury must apportion damages).
65. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Borel testified that, in his work as an insulator, his clothes were
continually covered in asbestos dust. Id. at 1082. Furthermore, he blew asbestos dust out of
his nostrils "by handfuls" at the end of a day. Id. at 1082.
66. See id. at 1086 n. 17.
67. See id.at 1086 n. 17. Borel did not have a problem establishing the identity of the
manufacturers of the asbestos to which he was exposed. See id. at 1102-03.
68. See id. at 1086.
69. See id. at 1086. The trial court reduced this amount by almost $21,000, the amount
received from the four defendants who settled before the trial. Id. at 1086.
70. See id. at 1086. The complaint further alleged failure to warn as to proper wearing
apparel and protective equipment, failure to test asbestos to determine the danger of use,
and failure to remove the products from the market once it was known that they would
cause asbestosis. Id. at 1086.
71. See id.at 1086. The jury found that all but two of the defendants were negligent,
but that none were grossly negligent. Id. at 1086.
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ble on the strict liability issue and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.7
The product defect alleged by Borel was marketing the product without
a warning relating to the danger of inhaling asbestos fibers. 7 Applying
Texas law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that manufacturers
are held to the knowledge and skill of experts and are expected to keep
abreast of scientific discoveries.7 4 Moreover, the danger of asbestos was
known to the defendants thus there were foreseeable risks. 7 Since the
risks were foreseeable, the defendants had a duty to warn which they
breached. 7' Although Borel could not prove the extent of exposure or the
precise product that caused his disease, he was able to prove that he had
been exposed to the products of all the defendants.7 7 The court concluded
that the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Landers v. East Texas Salt
Water Disposal Co. 78 did not bar the plaintiff's recovery merely because

72. See id. at 1086. The fact that the general verdicts were inconsistent with one another is of no consequence. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
73. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Under Texas law, a product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, and lacks an adequate warning. See Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514
S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
that when a manufacturer has knowledge, or should have knowledge, of the presence of a
danger in his product, he must provide an adequate warning. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A comment j (1965). Even if an "unavoidably unsafe product" is marketed because its utility outweighs its risks, the seller still has a duty to warn of those risks and
failure to do so "renders the product unreasonably dangerous." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
74. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Application of this standard enables the trier of fact to
determine whether the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger and whether
he was negligent in failing to warn the ultimate user or consumer. Id. at 1089. Further, the
manufacturer has a duty to inspect and test a product before marketing it so that, if it is
unavoidably unsafe, it may be made available to the public with adequate warnings. Id. at
1089-90.
75. See id. at 1092-93. The court referred to its discussion of the history of asbestos and
related diseases. See id. at 1083-85 nn. 1-16. Based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to
find foreseeable risks existed. Id. at 1093.
76. See id. at 1093. "Here the defendants gave no warning at all." Id. at 1093.
77. See id. at 1094. Two defendants claimed they could not be liable because the plaintiff was not exposed to their products until the mid-1960's. The court referred to the medical evidence establishing a five to ten year latency period and held that even recent exposures could have aggravated Borel's condition. Id. at 1094.
78. 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952). Landers joined the East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Company and Sun Oil Company seeking to recover damages for the pollution of a
small lake maintained on his property. Id. at 252-53, 248 S.W.2d at 731-32. Plaintiff alleged
that two separate pipelines, each owned by one defendant, ruptured on April 1, 1949 and
the ensuing leakage drained into his lake and killed all the fish. Id. at 252-53, 248 S.W.2d at
731-32. The defendants' pleas in abatement, asserting misjoinder of parties, were granted,
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he could not apportion liability.7 s The defendants, therefore, were held
jointly and severally liable.80
B.

The Similarity of DES and Asbestos Litigation

DES was not officially identified as a dangerous drug until 1971.81 Its
use as an anti-abortificant was criticized by some doctors from the time it
was introduced for that purpose."' Not until the incidence of clear-cell
adenocarcinoma, considered a rare cancer, began to rise in the late 1960's
was a link established between the disease and in utero exposure to
DES. 3 Asbestos, on the other hand, had been shown to be harmful as
early as the mid-1930's. 8 ' It has been linked to the diseases of asbestosis
and mesothelioma s5 Like clear-cell adenocarcinoma in DES daughters,
these diseases take from ten to twenty years to become manifest." The
asbestos fiber remains in the lung, so that a single exposure may result in

and the trial court ordered a severance, requiring plaintiff to replead. Id. at 253, 248 S.W.2d
at 732. The plaintiff refused to replead and his action for damages was, therefore, dismissed.
Id. at 253, 248 S.W.2d at 732. The pleas in abatement were granted in light of Sun Oil Co. v.
Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, holding approved). Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 254, 248 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1952). The rule in
Robicheaux provided "that an action at law for damages for torts cannot be maintained
against several defendants jointly, when each acted independently of the others and there
was no concert or unity of design between them." Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713,
715 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1930, holding approved). Thus, the plaintiff had to prove the
amount of damage caused by each defendant. Id. at 715. The Texas Supreme Court in
Landers noted that Robicheaux was a commission of appeals decision and the supreme
court did not adopt the opinion of the commission. See Landers v. East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 254, 248 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1952). The court expressly overruled
Robicheaux, stating when "the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an
indivisible injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to
the individual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for
the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment against any one separately or against all in one suit." Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
79. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
80. See id. at 1095.
81. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FDA DRUG
BULLETIN: DIETHYLSTILBESTROL CONTRAINDICATED IN PREGNANCY, November 1971.
82. See A. Herbst & H. Bern, Introduction and Background, in DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES) IN PREGNANCY 1 & n. 3 (1981).
83. See A. Herbst, The Epidemiology of Vaginal and Cervical Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma, in DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES) IN PREGNANCY 63, 64-69
(1981).
84. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
85. See id. at 1083-84.
86. See id. at 1084.
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either of the two diseases.87 Due to the long latency period, there is, as
with DES, a problem of identification of the tortfeasor." This problem,
however, usually exists for only one of two types of asbestos workers.8 '
Generally, the plant worker is able to identify the manufacturer of the
material to which he has been exposed.90 It is the insulation worker, who
may work in several plants and use several brands of asbestos insulation
over a long period of time, that has a problem identifying the manufacturer.9 1 Both DES and asbestos litigation are predicated on the same
principle-the defendants knew or should have known that the product
was dangerous. 2
Borel is the fountainhead from which all asbestos litigation in Texas
flows. The fact that there are many different plaintiffs, and only a few
recurring defendants, has given rise to plaintiffs urging collateral estoppel
on the issue of dangerousness of asbestos. 9 In effect, plaintiffs have argued that defendants who were a party in Borel are estopped from denying liability." This argument has met with a favorable response in federal
district courts, but has yet to be upheld on appeal."5

87. See id. at 1083. Borel and his fellow employees thought the fibers dissolved in their
lungs. Id. at 1082.
88. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
89. Telephone interview with Larry Cain, Esq., engaged in asbestos litigation in Sherman, Texas (Feb. 3, 1982).
90. See, e.g., Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff able to establish exposure to defendant's product); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff injured by defendant's products); Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff established
exposure to defendants' products), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
91. Telephone interview-with Larry Cain, Esq., engaged in asbestos litigation in Sherman, Texas (Feb. 3, 1982).
92. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1105 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert.denied,419 U.S. 869 (1974). Compare Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 118384 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff claims asbestos unreasonably dangerous) with Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (plaintiff alleged failure to warn in
DES case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
93. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn.
1982); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Flatt
v. Johns-Manville, 488 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (plaintiff invoked offensive collateral estoppel).
94. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn.
1982) (plaintiff relied on Borel in invoking collateral estoppel); Hardy v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (Borel is basis for granting collateral
estoppel); Flatt v. Johns-Manville, 488 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (plaintiffs invoke
Borel for imposition of collateral estoppel).
95. See Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1185 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Borel Misinterpreted

In Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 6 the widow of a deceased insulation
7
worker joined fourteen defendants in a wrongful death action.9 The
question to be determined in Migues was whether Borel could be read as
holding asbestos products were unreasonably dangerous as a matter of
law." The effect of such a holding would be the preclusion of the defendants, who had been joined in Borel, from relitigating the issue of dangerousness of asbestos." The court declined to address the issue since the
appellant was not a party to Borel.'00 Instead, attention was focused on
the stare decisis affect of Borel on non-Borel defendants given by the district court.10 1 In rejecting this theory of preclusion, the court of appeals
held the only determination made in Borel was that the jury's findings
were consistent with the evidence presented.103 The court held Judge
Parker misinterpreted Borel when he stated that the decision held asbestos was unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.103
D. Anticipating the Adoption of Market Share Apportionment in
Texas
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.0 4 is presently the only case suggesting the use of market share information in Texas. 05 As in Migues,
one of the issues raised by the defendants was the question of collateral
estoppel.'0 6 The Hardy court upheld its earlier decision that collateral estoppel was correctly applied.' 0 7 The pertinent aspects of Hardy are those

96. 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. See id. at 1183. Of the fourteen defendants, thirteen settled with plaintiff before
trial for $400,000. The remaining defendant went to trial on the merits. The jury awarded a
three million dollar verdict for the plaintiff that was reduced by the judge to one and onehalf million dollars. Id. at 1183.
98. See id. at 1183.
99. See id. at 1185.
100. See id. at 1185.
101. See id. at 1185. The trial court's interpretation of Borel, that all asbestos products
are unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law, was necessary for invoking stare decisis. Id.
at 1186. Since the defendants had never been found to have sold or manufactured asbestos,
the plaintiffs were required to prove that they had. Id. at 1186.
1.02. See id. at 1189.
103. See id. at 1187. The court stated that "upon reviewing Borel, we must conclude
that there is no such decisis to stare." Id. at 1187.
104. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
105. See id. at 1356.
106. See id. at 1360.
107. See id. at 1360-61. The court further stated that Texas recognized the "identity of
interest" rule, thus collateral estoppel could be invoked against non-Borel defendants. Id. at
1361. The plaintiffs in Hardy have filed an interlocutory appeal with the Fifth Circuit Court
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which relate to market share apportionment of liability.108 The court determined that it was necessary to explain its view of the application of
market share apportionment in Texas.10 9 The court recognized that Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"" required federal courts to apply state sub-

stantive law to the cause before them; however, there has been no multiple defendant asbestos case in Texas state courts."' The court refused to
wait for the Texas Supreme Court to rule on market share because it was
unknown when, if ever, such a case would reach the court. " 2 Therefore, in
the absence of a decision from a Texas court, the federal court was com-

pelled to prognosticate as to how Texas' courts would rule were they
faced with the issue. " 8
V.
A.

THE INDICIA FOR APPLYING

Sindell in Texas

Concurrent Liability

The Hardy court noted there were two factors which, when considered
together, indicate the probability of Texas adopting a market share con-

cept. 1 4 The first factor is the application of concurrent liability in
Texas.1 5 Concurrent liability permits concurrent tortfeasors to be held
jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's injuries."1 The court's rationale was that Sindell is based on Summers, in that the plaintiff in both

of Appeals. See Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1187 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1981). The court granted two motions urged by defendant Forty-Eight Insulations. FortyEight filed a motion for leave to file a cross-action based on market share, and motion for a
leave to conduct discovery. Id. at 1355. The court recognized that Forty-Eight sought the
benefit of market share for apportionment only, and not liability. Id. at 1356. Leave to conduct discovery should only be granted if it results in admissible, probative evidence. In this
case, Judge Parker believed it would probably result in judicial economy. Id. at 1356.
109. See id. at 1356. "[T]he question is too serious to be disposed of in a one-page
order." Id. at 1356. One defendant, however, claimed any discussion on market share would
violate the case or controversy rule and, in effect, be an advisory opinion. The court pointed
out, however, that defendant Johns-Manville was interested in the court's view. Id. at 1356.
110. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
111. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
112. See id. at 1356. The Erie doctrine presents an ironic problem. On the one hand, a
federal court is required to apply state law. On the other hand, as Judge Parker noted, these
are "true diversity cases" and, therefore, there may never be an asbestos case filed in Texas
courts. See id. at 1356.
113. See id. at 1356-57.
114. See id. at 1359.
115. See id. at 1359.
116. See id. at 1359.
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cases was unable to positively identify the tortfeasor.'P Moreover, since
Texas recognized concurrent liability in the Landers decision in which
the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could proceed to judgment
even if he were unable to apportion damages between the defendants,' Is
Judge Parker concluded that Landers and Summers are equivalent. 1 '
Texas, therefore, would modify Landers in the same manner California
modified Summers to reach the Sindell result of market share liability.'""
The district court concluded that, like Summers, the Landers rule was
too broad to be applied in an unchanged form.'"' To avoid the possibility
of the responsible DES manufacturer escaping liability, the California Supreme Court, in Sindell, required the plaintiff to join "the manufacturers
of a substantial share of the DES" market. "2 ' The Hardy court's reasoning implies that the Texas Supreme Court would impose a similar
requirement.
The argument that Texas would modify Landers to reach the same result, however, is tenuous at best. The only rational given by the Hardy
court to support this proposition is the recognition of Landers as the law
of Texas by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Borel.'2 2 From this premise, the court takes a prodigous leap in logic, and states, "Landers and

117. See id. at 1359. Compare Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (plaintiff unable to identify manufacturer of DES ingested by mother),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) with Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948) (plaintiff
unable to identify which defendant guilty of negligence).
118. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
119. See id. at 1359.
120. The Sindell court modified the Summers rule by requiring the plaintiff to join a
"substantial share" of the market. The purpose of the modification was to insure that one
innocent defendant was not held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Texas has a similar rule
stated in the Landers decision; that is, when the plaintiff cannot identify the tortfeasor in a
group of possible tortfeasors, the defendants must exculpate themselves to avoid liability.
See Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 258, 248 S.W.2d 731, 735
(1952). The Hardy court determined that if the Texas Supreme Court were confronted with
facts similar to those in Sindell, it would also modify Landers by requiring the plaintiff to
join the vast majority of the manufacturers so as to decrease the chance that the guilty
defendant would escape liability. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
121. Compare Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948) (plaintiff joined every possible tortfeasor) with Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 252-53,
248 S.W.2d 731, 731-32 (1952) (plaintiff joined both tortfeasors).
122. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
123. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex.
1981); see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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Summers are for the court's purposes precedential equivalents. 12 4 Without further explanation, the court's reasoning leaves too much to conjecture. Specifically, the court never states what its purposes were. The
court ended its discussion on this issue by stating, "[t]herefore, it is not
unwarranted to assume... Texas... would reach a Sindell result."' '
Such a conclusion,
however, rests on mere supposition rather than sound
12
legal precedent. 0
B. Comparative Causative Fault
The second factor identified in Hardy was a movement in Texas to
adopt comparative causative fault as an element of contribution in strict
liability cases. 27 There is some debate as to whether the Texas Legislature or Supreme Court will act first on this issue. 2 8 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that enterprise liability is "the only true means of comparative fault for asbestos-related cases . . . " and, therefore, Sindell
2
would find support in the Texas Supreme Court.1 9

VI.

MARKET SHARE LIABLITY: SOME UNANSWERED PROBLEMS

When one considers the three thousand plaintiffs in East Texas, the
urgent need to provide to those plaintiffs a remedy and at the same time
streamline the litigation process becomes readily apparent.12 0 The Supreme Court of California sought to provide the plaintiffs in Sindell, and
other plaintiffs similarly situated, a mechanism which would facilitate recovery for injuries they have suffered.' 8' While this is a noble and necessary goal, the opinion suffers from some rather obvious infirmities.
The most significant omission from the Sindell majority opinion is a
definition of the phrase "substantial percentage."'' 2 The court noted that
the plaintiff's class had joined approximately ninety percent of the DES
market, yet refused to decide whether that was a sufficient minimum percentage.1 8 Assuming the market share liability approach is valid, there is
124. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
125. Id. at 1359.
126. See id. at 1357, 1359.
127. See id. at 1359.
128. See id. at 1359 n. 16.
129. See id. at 1359.
130. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
131. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
132. See id. at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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still no determination as to whether the plaintiff or defendant is responsible for proving the particular market share, nor is there a standard as to
what formula should be used. 134 The plaintiff in a market share action
should be required to join, if possible, all of the manufacturers of the
product in question. In the case of DES or asbestos, the plaintiff may be
unable to determine the identity or existence of all the manufacturers.",5
In such a situation, joining seventy-five to eighty percent of the product's
manufacturers should suffice to give the plaintiff standing. 13 6 With this
percentage, the chances that the guilty tortfeasor would escape liability
are small. An additional factor is the ability of joined defendants in Texas
to implead other defendants of which the plaintiff may be unaware."3 "
The plaintiff should prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has
joined the requisite number of defendants before being allowed to proceed with the litigation.
The Sindell court failed to reach the issue of what geographic area
should be utilized in determining market share. Whether the Sindell
court's observation that the plaintiffs had joined ninety percent of the
market included markets without the state's boundaries is uncertain .'3
To illustrate, assume a manufacturer sells in only one area of the country,
and that area recognizes market share liability.3 ' If he is made a party to
a products liability action, the effect of fixing liability in this fashion will
result in far more than a mere "discrepancy between liability and market

134. See id. at 937-38 & n. 29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 & n. 29. One may presume that
since the burden of proving causation has been shifted to the defendants, so will the burden
of proving market share. See id. at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The defendants should bear
the burden for the same reason the Summers rule shifts the burden of proof of causation;
the defendant is usually in a better position to know. Even if they do not, they may be able
to prove they did not manufacture the product. See id. at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
135. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
136. See Comment, DES and a *4oposedTheory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 963, 996 (1978).
137. See, e.g., Riley v. Industrial Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 310, 302 S.W.2d 652, 655
(1957) (if less than all tortfeasors joined, those joined may bring in others); Fishel's Fine
Furniture v. Rice Food Mkt., 474 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, writ dism'd) (defendant may file cross-action against non-party); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1959, no writ) (court has
discretion regarding joinder of additional parties); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 37 (rule on
impleading).
138. Cf. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937-38 & n. 29, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145-46 & n. 29 (geographic area recognized as unaddressed by defendants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
139. Cf. d. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (causation measured by percentage of market),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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share."'14 There is the additional problem of a manufacturer that markets
his product nationwide, but has a substantially higher volume in one area
of the country. If market share is recognized as a concept nationwide, and
the scope of market share analysis is limited to state boundaries, then the
fact that a particular state or region is very profitable for a manufacturer
subjects him to increased potential liability.14 A firm's choice of market
strategy, therefore, may work to its detriment. Thus, without widely accepted, articulable standards for fixing liability based on market share,
the market share approach will penalize firms that profit from placing
their products in interstate commerce. To assure the most accurate result,
the scope of market share analysis must be 'limited in both geographic
area and time. If a defendant can show that he never sold in the area in
question or that his product was never distributed in the area, then he
has exculpated himself from liability. This is in keeping with the requirement of joining a substantial share in the first instance-to increase the
chance that only those who manufactured the product that injured the
plaintiff are held liable.' 2
The Sindell court also neglected to address the issue of limiting the
scope of liability in relation to time. If the litigation involves a defective
product with a long latency period, as does DES, the relevant market
should be established at the time of initial exposure, and not when the
cause of action accrues years later.4 3 Thus the scope would be limited to
the period during which plaintiff was exposed to the product. If a defendant can show that he was either not manufacturing the product at the
time, or that it was not distributed in the area at the time, he should be
dismissed from the action. The parameters defining the relevant market
should include the geographic area in which the litigation takes place, and
the period of time during which the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's product. The relationship between time and place is extremely important in the accurate determination of liability. Only those who represent a substantial share of the product's manufacturers should be
liable to the plaintiff. To exculpate himself, the defendant should show,
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not in the market at the
time.
Furthermore, courts presented with asbestos cases should take judicial
notice of the fact that asbestos is a competent producing cause of asbestosis and mesothelioma. Judicial notice coupled with market share liability
140. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
141. Cf. id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (liability is function of market share), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
142. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139,
145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
143. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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will enable claims to be settled more efficiently. "' Under such a system,
the plaintiff will have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence exposure to asbestos and the extent of damages.' 4 5 The burden of proof would
then shift to the defendants. To escape liability, defendants would have
to show that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs, or if they did, it was not
breached. 4 " Furthermore, they could show that they did not market asbestos at the time, or in the particular geographic area.' 47 Those defendants who could not exculpate themselves would have their liability determined by their share of the relevant market.'48
Given the possibility of the discriminatory effect of regional market
saturation, the theory of market share liability should be recognized on a
national level. Of course, the application should be limited to that rare
instance of a plaintiff who, if held to a requirement of identification of
the defendant's product as a producing cause of his injury, would be
barred from recovery. Further, when, as in the case of DES or asbestos,
there was a fundamental failure on the part of the manufacturer to either
ensure that his product was safe or warn the ultimate consumer or user of
the dangerous aspects of the product market share is appropriate. 14 9 This
is not to say that manufacturers should be liable for every conceivable
injury, rather only those injuries that are more likely than not to result

144. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 & nn. 1-16 (5th
Cir. 1973) (notes contain references to medical literature on dangers of asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The vast weight of authority points to the conclusion that the
dangers of asbestos are known and may be considered common knowledge. See id. at 108385 & nn. 1-16. Dr. Irving Selikoff of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory at Mt. Sinai
School of Medicine in New York, recently stated "diagnosis of asbestos related diseases has
reached a 'high degree of medical certainty,'" obviating the need for expert testimony in
routine cases. 68 A.B.A.J. 397, 398 (April 1982). As such, a court may take judicial notice of
an adjudicative fact. See Goodman v. Stalfort, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D.N.J. 1976),
aff'd in part mem., 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977); FED. R. EvID. 201. Rule 201(b) provides that
a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute. It must be either
generally known, or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to an accurate
source. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Further, when judicial notice of a fact is taken, the jury is
instructed to accept the fact as conclusive. See FED. R. EvID. 201(g); see also Selikoff and
Lee, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 487-520 (1978) (bibliography of over eight hundred works dealing with asbestos exposure and disease).
145. Cf. Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
The seven elements usually required would be reduced to the following three: (1) the defendants manufactured, marketed, sold, distributed or placed in the stream of commerce products containing asbestos; (2) plaintiffs exposure sufficient to produce disease; and (3) damages. See id. at 838.
146. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
147. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
148. See id. at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
149. See id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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from exposure to their products.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There must be a means to efficiently dispose of the multitude of pending asbestos claims without denying the plaintiff a remedy or the defendant due process. Requiring a plaintiff to identify a particular defendant
is not an acceptable method of reducing the number of claims.15 0 Market
share liability is a far more fair and expeditious approach. The effect
market share apportionment has on prospective defendants, however,
cannot be wholly ignored. There must be a balancing of the two interests.
Judicial economy should not be invoked to the detriment of the profit
motive. Market share is not, nor should it be, applied as a short cut for
the plaintiff. This extraordinary remedy should be invoked in only the
most dire of circumstances.

150. See id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

